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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GAIL PATRICIA MENZ,
Petitioner/Appellant
v.

CASE NO. 20000266-CA

WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ,
Respondent/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant
)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
In this brief "T" refers to the transcript of the proceedings
from the trial, preceded by terms such as "Trial T." or "Closing
T." or "Motion T." designate the volume, "Closing T." referring to
the "Closing Arguments and Judge's Ruling", dated April 28, 2000.
"R" refers to the record of the court, and "Ex" refers to exhibit,
followed by the exhibit number.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the provisions of 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, Section 5, Article
VIII of the Utah Constitution, and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW:
ISSUE ONE:
DID THE DISTRICT COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR PROCEDURALLY
IN TWICE MODIFYING FINDINGS AND A DECREE ENTERED BY THE JUDGE
WHO HAD HEARD AND TRIED THE CASE?
Standard for Review:
(1) A trial court's conclusions of law in a civil case
are reviewed for correctness and therefore no deference
is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law.
State v. Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994);

United Park City

Mines Co. v. Greater ffark City Co., 870 P2d 880 (Utah 1993) .
(2) Whether the trial court properly granted or denied a
motion to open a judgment for additional evidence or for a
new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P2d 518 (Utah
App., 1999)
ISSUE TWO:
DID THE COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR IN REALLOCATING THE
ASSETS AND DEBTS FROM THE ALLOCATION MADE FIRST BY JUDGE
THORNE AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN HIS OWN REVISED FINDINGS?
Standards for Review:
(1) Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce
matters so long as the decision is within the confines
of legal precedence. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P2d 1065
(Utah App. 1994).
(2) Property and alimony awards will be upheld unless a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.
2
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though there is evidence to support the finding. Cummings
v. Cummings, 821 P2d 472 (Utah App. 1991) .
(2) Appellate courts give great deference to the trial
court's findings of fact in divorce cases, and do not
overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. Elmer v.
Elmer, 776 P2d 599 (Utah 1989).
(3) To ensure the court acted within its broad discretion,
the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be
set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions.
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P2d 257 (Utah App. 1993) .
(4) Although considerable deference is accorded to
factual findings, conclusion of law arising from those
findings are to be reviewed for correctness and are given
no special deference on appeal. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P2d
1065 (Utah App. 1994) .
(5) The correctness of error standard means that no particular
deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions
of law.

State v. Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994).

(6) If the findings are legally inadequate marshalling the
evidence supporting the findings becomes futile. (Williamson
v. Williamson, 1999 Ut App 208.
ISSUE FOUR:
THE ARGUMENTS OF GAIL MENZ TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL MONIES
INTO THE MARITAL ESTATE ARE FALLACIOUS.
Standards of Review:
See standards for issues 2 and 3 above.
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6. Petitioner's Objections to Respondent's Proposed Decree of
Divorce, filed June 26, 2000. (R. 1121)
7. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by Judge
Thorne June 30, 2000, and entered July 5, 2000. (R. 1125).
NOTE: There are two sets of findings and two decrees initially. One
signed by Judge Thorne and then another signed by Judge Dever.
8. Decree of Divorce signed by Judge Thorne June 30, 2000, and
entered July 5, 2000. (R. 1142).
9. Respondent's Reply

to Petitioner's Objections to the

Proposed Findings and Decree, filed July 10, 2 000.
10. Minute entry by Judge Dever on November 2, 2000, deleting
portions of the findings and making corrections.

(R. 1160)

11. Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered
January 16, 2001, and signed by Judge Dever.. (R. 1184)
12. Revised Decree of Divorce entered January 16, 2001, signed
by Judge Dever. (R. 1197)
13. Petitioner's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Decree of Divorce, filed January 25, 2001. (R. 1205).
14. Reply of Respondent to Motion to Amend Findings and Decree
of Divorce. (R. 1248).
15. Second memorandum of petition in support of motion to
amend findings. (R. 1260)
16.

Hearing

before

Judge

Dever

on

April

4,

2001, on

petitioner's motions to amend findings and decree. (R. 1287, R.
1351-Transcript.)
17. Minutes from hearing on motion resulting in change of
6

property distribution. (R. 1288)
18. Order Amending Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce, signed by Judge Dever and entered June 6, 2001.
(R. 1297)
19. Motions filed to extend filing of notices of appeal. (R.
1312, and 1328) .
20. Order Extending Filing Date for Notice of Appeal and Cross
Appeal, entered August 1, 2001. (R. 1334)
21. Notice of Appeal. (R. 1304)
22. Notice of Cross Appeal. (R. 1337)
23.

Order

from

the

Court

of Appeals

resulting

from a

stipulated motion to remand, wherein the Court of Appeals ordered
the case remanded for a conference between Judges Thorne and Dever
to correct the record from the two conflicting decrees and sets of
findings.
24. Minute Entry of Judge Dever ruling on the Court of
Appeals' directions, signed and entered June 5, 2002.

(R. 1352)

(C) Disposition in Lower Court:
Bench trial conducted February 22 and 23, 2000.

Property

divided per ruling of Judge Thorne, embodied in Decree. The ruling
of Judge Thorne, his findings, and his Decree were amended twice by
Judge Dever, both on requests of petitioner Gail Menz to modify the
ruling of Judge Thorne. Modifications of the record and ruling of
Judge Thorne were made by Judge Dever under a temporary remand
order of the Court of Appeals.
7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The parties were married to each other on November 26,
1967, in Phoenix, Arizona. (R. 1)
2. Three female children were born as issue of the marriage
but

at

all

times

material

to

this

case

the

children were

emancipated and married.
3. The parties

separated

just after Christmas

in 1998,

(R.1186) but the petitioner had filed for divorce in November,
1998. (R. 1)
4. During the marriage the parties acquired a home in Salt
Lake County. Based upon appraisal testimony coupled with the loan
balance the court found that there was $313,000.00 in equity in the
home. This fact is not contested. (R. 1238) The appraisal date was
January, 2000. (Ex. Dl)
5. After the parties separated and before the appraisal was
performed Gail Menz had repairs and maintenance performed on the
family residence, such as painting the house and fence, tree
removal, repair of lights, the cost for which she valued at
$8,241.00.

(Ex. P15; Trial T. 140)

6. A second piece of real property had been purchased for one
of the daughters, and the court found that no interest was claimed
by either party. (R. 1240)
7. The court found that there was $20,000.00 in value for
household contents. (R. 1240) Judge Dever later lowered this tc
$8,500.00, which had been the estimated value some of the evidence
of Gail Menz.

Gail Menz testified at trial that it had a value of
8

about $5,000, but her testimony seemed very unsure and confused.
(Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 154; See also Ex. P16)
8. Gail Menz was awarded a 1998 GMC valued by the court at
$18,000.00. (R. 1348 (Trial T. Vol I, p. 45).
9. It was the intention of Judge Thorne to divide the assets
of

the marriage

equally,

but

in his

final

calculations he

inadvertently failed to add in the value of this GMC automobile
belonging to Mrs. Menz.

This defect in the calculations was

corrected by Judge Dever in his opinion of November, 2000, thus
changing the amount due Bill Menz and properly balancing the
amounts per the expressed intent of Judge Thorne. (R. 1160)
10. The parties owned a house trailer valued at $1,500.00. (R.
1188)
11. Bill Menz was awarded a pickup truck worth $28,000.00,
which he had purchased and used as his separate vehicle. (R. 1188)
12. Gail Menz had 401k and 454 accounts through her employment
as a teacher with Granite School District, which the court valued
at $20,000.00 as of the January, 2000 statement. (R. 1188, R. 1349
Trial T. Vol 1, p. 62)
13. However, as of June 30, 1999, the balance in her two plans
was $70,378.24 according to her testimony. (R.1349, Trial T. Vol.1,
p. 62)
14. She then made withdrawals leaving a balance of $20,000.00
as of the date of trial, or more accurately, as of the January,
2000 statement. (R. 1349, Trial T. Vol. 1, pp 62-63) Thus, she had
spent a little over $50,000 during that six month period while the

divorce action was pending.
15. A major issue was the fact that during the months prior tc
the filing of the divorce Mrs. Menz had accumulated approximately
$50,000.00 in credit card debt, about $40,000.00 of which was
expended for the three married daughters, and most of it for what
one may possibly characterize as extravagant gifts. (Ex. P2)
16. The parties had a debt with Zions Bank in the way of an
equity line of credit, with a balance of $13,533.73, which amount
was paid in full on November 5, 1998 by Gail Menz.

It does not

appear that additional charges were made against the account
between the time of separation and the time of payment, although
this isn't entirely clear from the record. (Ex. P3)
17. Gail Menz testified this debt entailed monies for a car
for one of the children (about $6,000), and the remainder went to
the kids, with part of it being used to pay off debts of the
children. (Trial T. Vol 1, pp 39-42; Trial T. Vol 2, pp. 170-171)
18. Bill Menz had been previously employed with Boart Longyear
Company.
fixed

He had a pension valued at $137,200.00, but this was a

account

that

generates

$1,632.00

per

month

gross and

$1,232.00 per month net income to him. (R. 1188)
19. Bill Menz has an IRA account valued at $317,000.00. This
was the value at the time of trial. (R. 1188)
20. Gail Menz had an IRA account valued at $100,000.00.
21.

To

this

point

the

combined

assets

listed

total

$954,700.00. (R. 1189)
22. For some time prior to the fall of 1998 the two parties

had been maintaining a joint account with Fidelity Investment.
(R.1350-Trial T. Vol 2, p. 209)
23. At that time, and as of the November 30, 1998 statement,
the account was valued at $404,840.97. (Ex. P18)
24.

It is undisputed, based upon the testimony of both

parties, that the nature of the Fidelity Investments account was an
account that where the monies were invested into securities, and
was not a cash account.

To draw money from the account one could

seek a loan against the securities, or have securities sold to
generate the desired funds.

(R. 1350, Trial T. Vol 2, pp. 146 and

209.)
25. Prior to this time, in August, 1995, Bill Menz received
the sum of $82,300.00 from an inheritance, and this amount was
invested into the joint Fidelity Investment account. (R. 1187)
26. After this point in time the mother of Gail Menz had died
and in January, 1997, Gail Menz received an inheritance from her
mother's estate in the amount of $176,000.00. (R. 1187; R. 1350,
Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 103.)

From this she took $140,000.00 and

invested into the joint Fidelity Investment account held with her
husband, Bill Menz. (R. 1187; R. 1350, Trial T. Vol. 1, pp. 28-32)
The remainder she used for her own purposes.
27. These monies were commingled during these time periods up
until the time of the separation of the parties and the withdrawals
of money from this account by Gail Menz. (R. 1349 Trial T. Vol. 1,
p. 33) Gail Menz testified that these monies were used by them to
pay for weddings, food, and other expenses. (Id.)
11

10
28. As stated above, at the time the marriage began tc
collapse in November, 1998, the account was valued at $404,840.97.
(Ex. 18) However, just prior to this November time, Gail Menz had
withdrawn an initial

sum of $140,000.00

from the account in

October. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 145.)
29. Upon learning that this was actually a loan against the
securities they owned in the account, she returned to Fidelity the
sum of $106,000.00.

(R. Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 145.; Ex. 18)

The

remaining $34,000.00 she kept and put in her Zions Bank account.
(Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 146)
30.

The

amount

of

$404,840.97

as of November

1, 1998,

reflected in Exhibit P18 is the balance in the account after the
prior withdrawal of $140,000.00. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 145, 146.)
31. After Gail Menz deposited the $106,000.00 with Fidelity
she withdrew from the same account the sum of $222,000.00 after the
sale of stock from the account. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 146) Thus, by
the end of November, 1998, Gail Menz has withdrawn from the account
at least the $34,000.00 plus the $222,000.00, for a total of
$256,000.00.

It is an agreed fact, as pointed out in the brief of

Gail Menz, that the actual total was $261,000.00 for the October tc
November period, which is correct when one adds in some additional
small withdrawals by Gail Menz during that October.

This left

$201,211.59 in the account as of the end of the November reportinc
period.

(Ex. P18)

The balance

as

of October

1,

1998 was

$422,997.07. (Ex. D9)
32. After Gail Menz withdrew $261,000.00 from the joint

Fidelity account there was a balance remaining of $201,211.59. (Ex.
P18) Bill Menz then took that money and deposited it into a new
account with Fidelity in his name alone. (Trial T. Vol 2, p. 201,
11. 9-13)
33. Over a period of time, apparently up until the time of
trial in February, 2000, that amount had grown to $277,992.00,
which growth Bill Menz testified resulted from "managing and
investing and--and watching it very carefully." (Trial T. Vol 2, p.
201.)

He had not made deposits into the account. (Id.)
34. On April 28, 2000, closing arguments took place before

Judge William A. Thorne, after which he made his ruling. (Closing
T.)

As part of ruling he stated as follows at p. 45:
"Let me state before I start that once inherited
income is placed into a joint account, it loses its
independent character and I'm not going to trace it back
beyond that. The parties make a decision to put it into
a joint account, it loses its separate identity and
becomes a joint asset."
He then proceeded to list the assets of the marriage.
35. Judge Thorne stated his position on his calculation of the

Joint Fidelity Account as follows:
"Plus, I then went back and calculated the value of the joint
savings account since I do not believe that a separate -maintains any kind of separate identity. The 145 that was
withdrawn, the 116 that was withdrawn shows 261 that was
withdrawn, 116 left over, for a total of 377.
"Adding that into the prior assets comes up with a total
assets of $1,331,700. Splitting that in half is $665,850.
"The reason I've split it in half is I do not believe that
the value is an issue in this marriage. Certainly, each side
can point fingers and say they're at fault for this or they're
at fault for that. This is not, in my mind, the circumstance
contemplated by the legislature where it indicates that fault
can be taken into account in distributing the assets of the

estate.
"Therefore, my goal is to divide the assets in half, coming up
with $665,850 for each." (Closing T. p. 46)
36. Judge Thorne signed the first set of Findings of Fact and
the first Decree of Divorce on June 30, 2000, and they were entered
on July 5, 2002.

(R. 1125 and R. 1142)

The fact that these

pleadings had been signed was not known to counsel for the parties
until different times in the future due to the fact that it took an
unusual period of time for the signed copies to reach the file.
37. Gail Menz filed an objection to the proposed findings and
decree on June 26, 2000. (R. 1121)
filed a reply to the objection.

The respondent, Bill Menz,

(R. 1148-1153)

38. On November 2, 2000, Judge Dever entered a Minute Entry in
response to the objection and reply filed by the respective
parties, which included substantial changes to the findings of
fact, but left in tact the conclusions and terms of the decree. (R.
1160)
39. On January 16, 2001, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were entered by Judge Dever in keeping with his prior minute
entry ruling.

(R. 1184 and R. 1197)

At this point there are now

two decrees and two sets of findings on file.

The language quoted

above from Judge Thorne's opinion and to a degree set forth in his
findings are also set forth in the amended findings of Judge Dever.
(R. 1184)
40. On January 25, 2001, the petitioner files a Motion to
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce. (R. 1205) This is the second proceeding commenced by Gail

Menz to amend the findings and decree.
41. After oral argument on April 4, 2001, minutes (R. 1288),
a proposed order and objection to the order, the court enters an
order again amending the findings and decree on June 6, 2001. (R.
1297)

These changes are as follows:
a. The court altered the disbursement and description
of monies in the Fidelity Investment Account. (R. 1298)
b. Gail Menz had paid a home equity loan and the
court found this was from her own money and therefore
reduced the equity in the home by $13,533.00, although
$13,500.00 is also mentioned. (R. 1299)
c. The inheritances of each are treated as separate
property and not as marital property. (R. 1299)
d. The value of the household furnishings is
reduced from $20,000.00 to $8,500.00. (R. 1230)
e. The court shifted around the disbursement of the
Joint Fidelity Account. (R. 1298)
f. The lien in the marital home in favor of Bill Menz
in the amount of $66,150.00, used by Judge Thorne to
equalize the disbursement of assets, was eliminated.
g. Bill Menz was ordered to pay to Gail Menz $17,822.00
to equalize the accounts. (R. 1301)
h. Bill Menz was awarded $76,781.00 from the Fidelity
account, which was above and beyond what the court
deemed to be joint funds. (R. 1301)

42. Judge Thorne, and later Judge Dever before his second
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change of the outcome, had found the total marital assets to be
divided to be $1,331,700.00. (R. 1191) The above changes by Judge
Dever resulted in marital assets of $566,967.00

(R. 1301), a

reduction of $162,122.00. This resulted in a net loss to Bill Menz
between the two opinions of $81,061.00.
43. Here a problem develops in the record due to the fact that
two decrees exist, along with an order amending the second.

As a

result the Court of Appeals orders the matter temporarily remanded
to resolve the problems extant in the record. (R. 1346)
44.

In a Minute Entry dated June 5, 2002, Judge Dever speaks

of a conference held between him and Judge Thorne relative to the
conflict between the two decrees. (NOTE: This is in the record,
just before R. 1284, in Vol. V, but is lacking a page number.
copy is attached as Addendum "A".

A

A letter from the Court of

Appeals to Judge Dever, dated May 1, 2002, is attached as Addendum
11

B", but is not a part of the district court record.)
45. In the minute entry Judge Dever states that the conference

was held as a result of a request by the parties, which isn't
exactly correct since the matter had been remanded by the Court of
Appeals to resolve the problem.

It is correct in that the

attorneys for the two parties did ask that an actual conference
take place as contemplated by the order from the Court of Appeals
and that Judge Dever not merely make a decision on his own.
46. This minute entry states that it was Judge Thome's
position that his decree and findings had been signed with the
assumption that there had been no objection made. However, an
16
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objection had been filed by the petitioner, and a note to this
effect had been placed on the front sheet of the findings of fact
signed by Judge Thorne. This note has been moved, probably due to
the existence of the note having been an issue before the oral
argument with Judge Dever, from its original location on the papers
signed by Judge Thorne to the face of the Order amending the
findings signed by Judge Dever, located at R. 1297.

The note,

apparently from the clerk, reads as follows: "Judge Thorne

There

are objections from Suzanne West. Do you want me to set tel/con.!!)
47. The fact that Judge Thorne had signed a decree and
findings was made known to Judge Dever by the attorney for Bill
Menz at the oral argument hearing on the second proceeding to amend
the findings of fact, although counsel for Gail Menz represented to
the court that Judge Thorne had never signed any such papers.
(Motion T. p. 25)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
Gail Menz filed two objections to the findings and conclusions
made first by Judge Thorne and then by Judge Dever.

This should

not be allowed and the first findings and decree signed by Judge
Dever should be the governing ruling of the lower court and not the
second ruling. Even if the second is construed as a Motion for New
Trial Under Rule 59, the court procedurally erred in its ruling and
the manner in which it was handled.
POINT II:
Judge Dever ignored certain facts, didn't understand others,
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resulting in a ruling that reallocated property in an erroneous
manner that is unsupported by the facts, and was contrary to his
own findings.

The result was a division of property that was not

supported by the facts and was not equitable.
POINT III;
Great deference should be given to the judge who tried the
case. Judge Dever's modifications of Judge Thome's ruling should
require the same standard of review as an appellate court's review
of a trial court's findings.
POINT IV:
Judges Dever and Thorne were

ordered by

this

court to

conference and resolve the differences in their two opinions. From
the minute entry of Judge Dever it appears that the conference went
only so far as to have Judge Thorne indicate he hadn't known there
was an objection to his findings and decree and they should
therefore be of no effect.

From the very scant record it appears

Judge Dever then proceeded alone to decide how the property was to
be divided, despite the fact that the trial judge was available.
It doesn't appear that the trial judge, Judge Thorne, took part in
deliberations so that a joint ruling from both judges did not issue
as to what findings of fact and conclusions of law should be used,
and instead only one judge's opinion is shown in the final order.
POINT V:
The appeal of Gail Menz seeks to have the increased value of
the money Bill Menz took from the remainder of the joint Fidelity
Account included in the joint marital property and be divided by
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the court.

While she spent he saved, and it was argued to both

judges this claim was inequitable due to her proclivity to spend
and Bill Menz to save.

Judge Thorne used the date of division of

the accounts as the governing date for this asset and that date
should stand.

ARGUMENT DETAIL

ISSUE I;
DID THE DISTRICT COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR PROCEDURALLY
IN TWICE MODIFYING FINDINGS AND A DECREE ENTERED BY THE JUDGE
WHO HAD HEARD AND TRIED THE CASE?
After the first Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorce were submitted to the court Gail Menz filed
an objection to those findings and the decree. (R. 1110)

This

objection covers the same issues raised later in the second motion.
In a Minute Entry from November, 2000, (R. 1160) Judge Dever made
modifications to the findings and decree, but basically left the
property division ordered by Judge Thorne intact. (R. 1184)
The new findings and decree were entered January 16, 2001, (R.
1203) and Gail Menz then filed a "Petitioner's Motion to Amend
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce", on
January 25, 2001.

We submit the court allowing a hearing and

awarding relief on this second motion was in error.

The hearing

proceeded despite an objection by counsel for Bill Menz. (Motion T.
24-25; R. 1248)
There is nothing in the rules that we are able to locate that

gives a party two shots at amending findings and/or a decree. Gail
Menz had already filed one objection and the court had made certain
modifications from the ruling made by judge Thorne, as seen in the
attachment to the minute entry. (R. 1162)

Gail Menz then should

have appealed, or filed a motion for a new trial. She did neither,
but instead filed yet another motion to modify the findings and
decree.
One may argue that the motion was in effect a Motion for a New
Trial under Rule 59, U.R.C.P., and that the title of the motion
should not weigh against her.

However, from its content, the

nature of the argument and the nature of the proceedings the motion
is

clearly

not

a motion

for

a

new

trial, but

instead

is

definitively a request that the court modify once again the ruling
of the trial judge. The trial court has broad discretionary power
to grant or deny new trials, and is based upon the need to correct
a jury verdict (there was no jury here), correct findings which it
believes to be in error (but where does the discretion of the trial
judge lie?), or where there is substantial doubt that the issues
were fairly tried (this wasn't even alleged) . See Page v. Utah Home
Fire Ins. Co.. 391 P2d 290 (1964).
There having been no jury, and no allegation of unfair trial
proceedings, we are left with the issue of correcting findings and
a decree believed to be in error.

However, we assert several

points or error even on this argument.

In her motion Gail Menz's

attorney files an affidavit stating they were surprised by the
actions of Judge Thorne treating the Fidelity account as commingled

property.

(R. 1284) However, we submit this is not substantiated

because from the very inception in the answer of Bill Menz to the
complaint he denied that the inheritance of Gail Menz was separate
property. (R. 67) Gail Menz was upon notice this was an issue and
should have anticipated

this issue at trial.

There was no

stipulation or scheduling order that in any way established that
the inheritance monies were to be treated as property rights to be
vested in each inheriting party separately.
Furthermore, it is well established that a motion for a new
trial must be supported by an affidavit showing at least one of the
circumstances specified in Subdivision (a) of the rule. [Schindler
v. Schindler, 776 P2d 86 (Utah App. 1989)]

The opening paragraph

of Subdivision (a) reads as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or any of the
issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however,
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a
jury, the court may open the judgement if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusion of law or make new findings and conclusions and
direct the entry of a new judgment: [the 7 areas or grounds
follow at length in the text.]
The affidavit does state one ground, surprise as to one issue
only, but the motion requests modifications in three other major
areas of the case that are not supported by an affidavit. If we
were

dealing

with

irregular proceedings

or unfair practices

touching upon the entire case this might suffice, but it should not
serve if the affidavit goes only to one point based upon the claim
of surprise.

The surprise in no way affects or touches upon the

other three claims in the motion, yet the court proceeded to make

changes in each of these areas without any supporting affidavit of
wrong doing under subdivision (a) of Rule 59.
This court will note that the proceedings and ruling by Judge
Dever on the motion to amend were treated in their entirety like a
motion to amend, without there being any semblance that the matter
was being treated like a motion for a new trial. (Motion T.)

This

is clear from not only the content of the motion itself and the
nature of the hearing, but from the result.

Under Rule 59 the

court is limited to ordering a new trial, allowing a party to
choose between a remittitur or new trial, or taking new testimony
and making new findings. The court did none of these. Instead the
court simply ruled on the motion to amend the pleadings, which
constituted nothing more than a second ruling on a Rule 52 motion
to amend the pleadings, or possibly under Rule 4-504(2), Rules of
Judicial Administration, dealing with the submission of objections.
In any event, the point upon which to focus is that nothing in the
way of a new trial was consummated, and what in fact occurred were
hearings on two separate pleadings filed by Gail Menz to amend the
ruling of Judges Thorne and Dever. There must be a limit to how
many times one can assail a court's opinion without taking an
appeal.

ISSUE II;
DID THE COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR IN REALLOCATING THE
ASSETS AND DEBTS FROM THE ALLOCATION MADE FIRST BY JUDGE
THORNE AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN HIS OWN REVISED FINDINGS?
In the statement of facts above we have set forth the primary
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assets of the parties and how they were distributed.
divisions

are

not

at

issue,

but

in

Judge

Dever's

Some
second

modification he dealt with certain points we discuss individually
below and with which we take issue concerning the following:
1. VALUATION OF HOUSEHOLD CONTENTS
Judge Thorne found that the contents were worth $20,000.00,
and indicated that he found the estimate of Gail Menz of $8,500.00
to be too low in her answers to interrogatories, but her verbal
testimony was that they had a value around $5,000.

She really had

no idea of their value, nor of the extent of the assets she owned.
(Trial T. Vol.2, p. 153-154)

Judge Dever thought $20,000.00 was

too high and put it back down to $8,500.00, although he made no
specific finding on how he arrived at the amount, or why $20,000.00
was too high.

Keep in mind that Judge Thorne had the right to

determine that her estimates on many of these items were too low,
and Gail Menz clearly had an incentive to estimate the values as
low as possible.

(We note at this point that even from the

testimony of Gail Menz and the information in Exhibit P16, it isn't
clear where the $8,500 figure originated.)
a. If one takes the value placed on the property by Gail Menz
in Exhibit

P16, answer number 76, without

giving any value

whatsoever to the items she states have merely "minimal" or "no",
or "unknown" value, one arrives at an amount of $5,995.00. This is
from property she considers to be joint property that she wanted.
b. If takes the following items for which she gave no value
and adds our own estimated value, which we have done, we have the

following result:
(1) Yard card equipment and tools:

$300

(2) Satellite dish:

$100

(3) Curio cabinet & wall hangings:

$200

(4) 2 sofas and 1 love seat:

$400

(5) Cleaning supplies and equipment:

$150

(6) Linens:

$200

(7) Lamp:

$30

(8) Other wall hangings:

$50

(9) Oval desk:

$40

(10) Living room lamp:

$20

(11) Comforter:

$20

(12) Food:

$250

This court can place its own estimate, but using these figures
we now come up with a total value of $7,755 for only the items she
listed.

All of these are market values and not replacement values,

which it was testified by Gail Menz would be much higher. (Trial T.
Vol. 2, p. 154-155)
c. We next go through the items in the home that she kept but
didn't list in her interrogatory answer

(See Trial T. Vol. 2,

beginning at p. 180:
(1) She replaced the dining set the family had and kept
the old one. Let's give it a value of $300.
(2) Refrigerator:

She bought a new one, and the old one

seems to have needed some repairs, although a friend of
Gail Menz testified it looked like a good refrigerator

to her (Trial T. Vol. 1, p. 83), so lets give the old
one that she kept a value of $200. (Ibid. p. 181)
(3) She bought a second freezer.

Let's give the old

one a value of $100. (Id.)
(4) She already had a 62" TV downstairs, but bought
a new one for $1900 for the upstairs.

Let's give this

older 62" TV a value of $750. (Ibid. p. 182)
(5) Existing range: She bought a new one. Let's give it
a value of $100. (Id.)
(6) Existing dishwasher: She bought a new one. Let's give
it a value of $100.
Gail Menz testified that she thought Bill Menz was going to take a
lot of these things, but there is no evidence that he did, and he
didn't. (Ibid. p. 184)

In fact, the evidence was that he was

living in a 20 foot house trailer, and it was obvious he hadn't
taken any of the things from the home other than his personal
effects and a T.V.

(Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 197)

This now brings the value of items up to $9,305.

It is

important to keep in mind that this doesn't include many things
that

a

family

normally

accumulates--everything

from

cooking

equipment, dishes, and the like, to books, music collections,
travel and camping gear, tools, etc., etc.
Reviewing Ex. P2, we see a long list of purchases going back
for a number of years, some of which Gail Menz were purchased for
the children, and which fact we do not dispute. But what items on
the long list of credit card receipts are for the children and what

are for the household of the parties?

It isn't at all clear. Gail

Menz likes " . . . nice things, comfortable things." (Trial T. Vol.
2, p. 179)

It was argued on behalf of Bill Menz that it was

difficult to believe that after a marriage of over 30 years, and
living in a home in the Olympus Hills area of Salt Lake with a main
floor of 1,860 square feet of living space, and a basement of 2,245
square feet, 80% of which was finished, and which home had an
appraised value of $375,000, the home in which the parties were
living had only $9,305 worth of household contents total.

(Ex. Dl)

Exhibit P2 shows a broad range of purchases over a short
period of time which it is very difficult to believe were all for
the children, despite the undisputed fact that Gail Menz did over
spend for her children.

As just a few examples, we see purchases

from Ultimate Electronics, August, 1996, twice for $1,369.97 twice;
September, 1996, Ultimate Electronics, $159.13; May, 1996 from Free
Meyer for $339.05;

May, 1996 from Ultimate Electronics foi

$297.21; July, 1997 from Wicker & Willow for $105.04 and foi
$1,388.85; Fred Meyer, June, 1998 for $320.16; etc., etc. Bear ir
mind that these represent only a few purchases during the last twe
years of the marriage by a woman given to extravagant spending.
We submit that Judge Thome was well within his discretionary
rights in finding that $8,500 worth of contents considering all oi
these circumstances was simply way too low, and that the $20,00(
figure was more accurate.

2. TREATMENT OF INHERITED PROPERTY AS SEPARATE PROPERTY.
Judge

Thorne

ruled

that

the

inherited

monies

had been

commingled to such an extent that they had lost their separate
character.

Judge Dever disagreed.

Throughout the testimony Gail

Menz keeps speaking about how she had used her inheritance to buy
household items, and the like. (Trial T. Vol. 2, pp 180-185)

The

point missed here by Gail Menz and the district court in the motion
hearing is that merely because there was enough money in the
account to pay back both parties what they had invested originally
doesn't mean that the inherited monies have retained their separate
character.
The evidence showed that Bill Menz received his $82,300
inheritance in August, 1995 and had invested it in the Fidelity
account.

By the time Gail Menz invested her $140,000 in the

account in January of 1997 the money Bill Menz had invested had
been reaping profits for about a year and a half, so when she
invested her money in 1997 the account already had considerably
more than the $82,500, from which she benefited and which money she
used.

By the time of the withdrawal by Gail the money of bill had

been earning income for 3.5 years and hers for only 1.5 years.
30-3-5, U.C.A., requires that the court make an "equitable
division" of the property owned by the parties.

In the order

signed by Judge Dever amending for the second time the finds and
decree he found that "Under Utah law, inherited property of a
spouse which has been commingled with joint marital property shall
remain

x

separate' property

of the inheriting
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spouse

if such

inherited property can be traced." (R. 1299) This is not a correct
statement of Utah law, nor was his opinion properly supported by
findings.

In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P2d 304, at 308 (Utah

1988), our Supreme Court stated s follows:
"We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making 'equitable'
property division pursuant to 30-3-5 should, in accordance
with the rule prevailing in mst other jurisdictions and with
the division made in many of our own cases, generally ward
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during
the marriage . . .
to that spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property,
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it. . . ., or (2)
the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has
made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse."
(Emphasis added.)
The district court made no findings relative to any of these
issues, ignored the findings Judge Dever himself had previously
made, and ignored the findings of the trial judge, Judge Thorne,
but instead merely stated that inherited property is the separate
property of the inheriting spouse--end of issue.

As we have

stated, it is not satisfactory to conclude that inherited property
has retained its separate character merely because there are
sufficient funds in an account to pay that amount of money to the
donor to the account who had inherited the money originally.
It is clear from the facts that the parties had commingled the
monies into one account, had used those monies to pay for a variety
of family expenses, and that in fact the money of Bill Menz hac
been building interest in the account much longer than had th<
money of Gail Menz.

We raise the issue of how the district courl

can justify such a division when Gail Menz withdrew $261,000 froi
9A

the

account

and

Bill

Menz

was

left

with

the

remainder of

$201,211.59, Where is the equity in that? The court does not say.
During the marriage it was Bill Menz who funded and managed
the account

(Trial T. Vol. 2 pp

165-169).

Bill Menz even

contributed the start up money for the IRA account of Gail Menz
(Ibid, at 169) . Bill Menz paid half of his income to Gail Menz for
household expenses and the other half into savings. (Trial T. Vol.
2, p. 162. --Testimony of Gail Menz.)
As shown in the evidence above, Gail Menz didn't even know
how the account worked, and had to redeposit monies because what
she had withdrawn was a loan against stocks held in the account.
Furthermore, it is clear that during that time the monies of the
parties, existing together for years in one account, accumulated
interest, and was used for common purposes, yet how is this to be
divided, and can initial deposits to this joint property under such
circumstances be considered separate property? The only reasonable
solution is an even distribution of the property.

Otherwise Gail

Menz walks away with an extra $60,000. Where are the findings that
show she is entitled to that amount?

Where are the findings that

show her $140,000 generated that share of the surplus created above
the original investments and after the joint expenditures?
are no such findings.

There

As from the Mortensen case, we have clear

commingling, we joint use, we have enhancement through joint
efforts, or even by the sole efforts of Bill Menz, and thus a
departure from the Mortensen rule of awarding the property to the
donor, along with any increase, is warranted. Moreover, there was

absolutely no showing by Gail Menz, or findings by the district
court as to how much each account increased in value.
In addition, this case does not seem to square with the
requirements set down in Burt v. Burt, 799 P2d 1166 (Utah App.
1990), wherein Mrs. Burt had inherited property and invested it in
separate accounts or invested it separately in stocks and bonds.
While the form changed, the separate identity remained the same.
Furthermore, the court in Burt found that as long as marital assets
were used to maintain the family and the separate property.

This

is not so in this case where Gail Menz testified that the family
had used monies from the account over the years to pay for various
family expenses.
An extract from the testimony of Gail Menz at the trial is
illustrative of the events involved in the handling of the monies:

/////////////////////////////////////////////

Examination by Ms. West of Gail Menz:

Q. And at that time, wasn't the money that the two of you had,
whether it was inheritance or other, wasn't that all in one
account, commingled?
A. Yea. It was commingled. We put it all together.
Q. Now, has Mr. Menz, over the years, spent money on the
children-A. Yes.
Q. --the grown children?

A. Oh yes, Uh huh.
Q. Give a couple of examples,
A. Lots of--well, we got them cars and we took them on lots of
trips to Hawaii, Mexico and lots of other places.
Q. In your opinion, was that--in your belief, was that
expenditure, the monies that you and Mr. Menz had accumulated for
the betterment of the family unit?
A. Yes.

(Trial T. Vol. 2, pp 189-190)

//////////////////////////////////////////////

Based upon the foregoing we submit that the monies had been
commingled, that deviation from the rules in Mortensen is required,
and that an equitable division as made by the trial judge should be
mandated by this court, and the inequitable division of Judge
Dever, unsupported as it was by adequate findings, be reversed.

3. ZIONS BANK HOME EQUITY LOAN
It

is undisputed

that

for

some

years

the parties had

maintained an equity line of credit with Zions Bank, and that in
November of 1998, almost two months before the parties separated,
Gail Menz paid the balance off in the amount of $13,533.73.
P3)

(Ex.

We do not dispute this, nor does it appear that at least for

some months prior to the pay off date there had been no purchases.
We dispute the ruling by Judge Dever wherein he reduced the
equity amount in the home for division by this amount due to the
fact that Gail Menz had paid this amount for two reasons:
a. The debt was paid November 5, 1998, (Ex. P3) , and we
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propose with joint funds. The parties didn't separate until just
after Christmas of that year. The parties were not only still
married but still lived together for almost another two months.
She says she used her "inheritance" money to retire the debt.
However, from Ex. P18, she withdrew the monies from the Fidelity
account the second time to correct for what had been in fact a loan
from Fidelity earlier the withdrawals took place on November 10th
and 11th, and not on or before the pay off date of November 5,
1998.

She testified that she had retained $34,000 from the first

effort she made to withdraw the money and she could have used this
money--but she didn't. She testified that she put this money into
a private account with Zions Bank. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 146)

She

couldn't have used the $106,000 difference because she testified
she put that back into the Fidelity account.
come from.

Where did the money

Clearly not from "her inheritance".

It must therefore

have come from joint monies.
b. The trial judge, Judge Thorne, could very well have taken
other factors into consideration in his decision to divide the
property equally, even if she had used her own funds to pay off
this particular debt. These factors are critical in understandinc
Judge Thome's ruling, as well as appreciating why the ruling of
Judge Dever should be reversed.
Examples

of

critical

equitable

issues

to be

considerec

throughout this appeal are as follows:
1. Gail Menz had

retirement accounts at the time the parties

separated, with a value as of June, 1999 of approximately $70,378

32

By the time of trial the balance was at $20,000. Thus, while the
action was pending she had spent $50,378 of an asset that was
subject to division by the court--retirement

accounts.

(See

paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 or Statement of Facts above.)
2. After she took the money out of Fidelity she opened an
account with Vanguard. During the year prior to the trial she sold
$166,982 of stock from that account. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 168/ Ex.
P19).

Mr. Menz got nothing of this.
3. She had run up almost $50,000 in credit card debt, most of

which was not known by Bill Menz, and about $39,000 of which had
been used for rather extravagant gifts for three married daughters.
(Ex. P2)

We argued against Mr. Menz paying half of this,

particularly since he hadn't known about it, but in light of the
overall ruling by Judge Thorne Mr. Menz did not lodge further
protests, and Bill Menz paid one-half of these bills as required by
the court's decree.
Therefore, there appear to be no facts that support that Gail
Menz paid for the Zion's Bank bill from her own money. It was paid
off before the parties separated, and should therefore not have
been a reduction in the equity of the home at the time of trial in
February of 2000.

There were also other equitable considerations

that support the original division of the court, but weigh against
the modifications made by Judge Dever.
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ISSUE III;
DID THE SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS TO JUDGE THORNE'S FINDINGS
BY JUDGE DEVER CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND DID
SUCH CHANGES LEAVE THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITHOUT ADEQUATE
FINDINGS TO SUPPORT THEM?
It is established beyond any point of dispute that a trial
judge is to be granted broad discretion in his decision making
process in domestic law matters.

"Trial courts may exercise broad

discretion in domestic matter so long as the decision is within the
confines of legal precedence."
(Utah App. 1998)

Childs v. Childs, 967 P2d 942, 944

The court's exercise of this discretion is

presumed to be correct absent "manifest injustice of inequity that
indicates a clear abuse of . . . discretion."
for these decisions are clear.

(Id.)

The reasons

The advantages of the trial judge

in being able to view first hand the witnesses, the evidence,
become more deeply acquainted with the facts of the case, etc., all
enhance the ability of the trial judge, as a rule, to make more
accurate and fair decisions in divorce cases.
The question then arises, does this apply to this case. Ir
this situation we have Judge Thorne who tried the case and whc
signed off on the first set of findings and a decree. Judge Dever,
without the advantage of having been involved with the trial, made
changes that resulted in a net loss to Bill Menz of over $80,000,
Does this discretionary privilege still lie with the trial judge
when

we

have

a

review

by

another

district

judge?

Thougl

authorities may exist, we have been unable to find any that fi1
this rather unique situation, which resulted from Judge Thome'i
appointment to the bench on the Court of Appeals and Judge Deve:

when

we

have

a

review

by

another

district

judge?

Though

authorities may exist, we have been unable to find any that fit
this rather unique situation, which resulted from Judge Thome's
appointment to the bench on the Court of Appeals and Judge Dever
taking the case over immediately after Judge Thorne signed the
first set of findings and original decree.
We must question too the findings made by Judge Dever as to
their adequacy.
dates used.

One problem in the case is the varied valuation

While a trial court is generally required to use the

date of trial as the valuation date, the "trial court has broad
discretion

to

separation."

use

a

different

date,

such

as

the

date

of

Mo reran v. Morgan, 854 P2d 559, 563 (Utah App. 1993)

But the more critical issue is the apparent failure of Judge
Dever in the second round of proceedings to make adequate findings,
and at one point early on to drastically change findings originally
approved by Judge Thorne, and which frankly appear to be necessary
and supportive to a degree of the decisions made by Judge Thorne,
as well as the relief sought herein.

We refer the court to the

rather drastic changes made in Judge Dever's minute entry beginning
on R. 1166.

The original entries seem well supported by the

testimony and exhibits, yet the court chose to exclude many
important facts which we submit is an abuse of discretion and
leave unsupported many of the conclusions, particularly where the
judge who made these changes was making them at a time based solely
upon memoranda, without the aid of a transcript, and certainly
without the aid of having actually heard the evidence in person.

In issues above we have cited a number of instances where we
believe the court under Judge Dever failed to adequately support
his position with adequate findings. One is the failure to back up
the payment of the Zions' Bank pay off with adequate findings.
Another is the failure of the court to factually support with
findings the court's claim that the inherited property had retained
its separate character.
This Court of Appeals remanded this matter for a conference
between the two judges, and from all appearances it appears that
the conference was minimal, and that Judge Dever was allowed tc
rule on virtually all issues. We submit this was not the intent of
the joint motion, nor do we believe it was the intent of this
appellate court, with the result being additional error by the
district court. Had there been an adequate conference between the
two judges and a joint decision on what constituted a proper set of
findings and decree one and maybe both of the appeals in this case
could have been avoided. We ask this court to establish guidelines
for the operation of a district conference between the judges
involved on a remand such as the one in this case.
Based upon the foregoing we submit that Judge Dever7s rulinc
is lacking in factual support, and that his actions were an abuse
of discretion. We further submit that the standard for his review
of Judge Thome's ruling should have been the same as an appellate
court's review of a trial judge's actions. Unless Judge Dever waj
able to factually show that Judge Thorne had abused his discretioj
within the guidelines provided by the appellate courts of thii

state, the original decision of Judge Thorne should have remained.

ISSUE IV:
THE ARGUMENTS OF GAIL MENZ TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL MONIES
INTO THE MARITAL ESTATE ARE FALLACIOUS.
In her brief Gail Menz argues that there is approximately
another $76,000 which should be included in the marital estate and
be subject to division.

This money, she argues is found in the

form of the difference between the value of the Fidelity account
after the raid on it by Gail Menz, in the amount of $201,211.59
(Ex. P18), and the $277,992 ( Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 201) that existed
at the time of trial, which Mr. Menz testified was his traditional
IRA account.

Let us assume, however, that Mr. Menz was in error

and this isn't his traditional IRA account, but is the balance
after the withdrawal by Gail Menz, plus growth over the period of
about 14 months from the end of November until the time of trial.
Gail Menz argues that the burden is on Bill Menz to show where
that money came from.

This is not true.

Based upon what?

He

testified that it is his money, and is probably the balance of the
Fidelity money that he transferred to a private account with
Fidelity with only his name and no longer with both names on the
account.

If they seek to show that other sources of income were

used to augment this account then the burden is on them, not Bill
Menz. Gail Menz herself testified, as pointed out above, that Bill
Menz regularly deposited monies into his accounts, although the

only testimony on the growth related to this account is that of
Bill Menz who testified that the growth was entirely from increased
value in the account.

But is this kind of growth possible?

Gail Menz's IRA grew from $65,000 to $100,000 in one year.
(Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 167; Ex. 2) Exhibit P18 shows growth during
the month of November, 1998, on the joint account of $18,205.52.
In October, 1998, the joint account realized a $16,760.30 increase
in value.

Based on these figures it is not difficult to believe

that Bill Menz's account increased by this amount.
Next, we should consider what each did with their monies and
what kind of a valuation date one should use.

During the time of

the trial Gail Menz spent most of her Granite School District
retirement money, and spent a good deal of money from her Vanguard
account.

She bought many expensive things for the family home b>

her own admission.

Mr. Menz on the other hand lived in a 20 foot

house trailer and conserved his money.

This has been a lone

standing issue in the case and both judges rejected the view of
Gail Menz.

Her position is that she should be able to live a

prodigal lifestyle spending her money as she wishes, while Bil]
Menz saves his money, and then at trial she wants half of his
increase. We submit there is not equity in this. She has cited nc
compelling authority for this proposition, nor has she presentee
any evidence that shows any abuse of discretion by the lower court
in rejecting this argument.
CONCLUSION
We will be brief. The arguments above speak for themselves a

to each point. It is the position of Bill Menz that the court made
one change to the ruling of Judge Thorne, which essentially left
the conclusions in place.

That ruling, or the ruling of Judge

Thorne should be reinstated, and become the controlling ruling in
this case.

The second ruling by Judge Dever is procedurally

incorrect, plus it abuses the discretion granted to the lower
court.

While the first revision of Judge Dever may need to have

some of the findings made by Judge Thorne reinstated

to be

adequately supported by factual findings, the conclusion at that
point in time should be the ruling, and the second ruling of Judge
Dever should be reversed.

The claims of Gail Menz in her appeal

regarding the increased value of Mr. Menz's account.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of November, 2002.

for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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Ufeah Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEC 2 i 2001
Pau&tte Stagg
Cleric of the Court

00O00

Gail Patricia Menz,
ORDER

Appellant and Cross-appellee,
v.

Case NO. 2301G567-CA

William Jeffrey Menz,
Appellee and Croes-appellant.

This matter is before the court on a stipulated motion to
temporarily remand the case to the district court to correct or
modify the-record pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Jointly, the parties raise several
questions regarding differences in the district court record that
must "be submitted to and settled by that court." id.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for temporary remand is
granted. Upon the trial court's disposition of this matter, the
clerk shall immediately transmit the supplemental record to this
court,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are granted twentyone days from the entry of trial court's disposition to amend
their respective docketing statements on appeal.
DATED this<g££& day of December, 2001.
FOR THE COURT:

Mmela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

lan H. Jackson
ing Judge
th M. Billings
ate Presiding Judge
eil W. Bench

Utaf) Court of appeal*
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230

is Z. Davis
sla T. Greenwood
ory K. Orme

Appellate Clerks' Office (801) 578-3900
Judges' Reception (801) 578-3950
FAX (801)578-3999
TDD (801) 578-3940

Marilyn M. Branch
Appellate Court Administrator
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

*m A. Thorne, J r .

May 1, 2002
Judge L.A. Dever
Third District Court
450 South State St
PO Box 1860
Salt Lake City UT 84114-1860
Re:

Mehz v. Menz

Case" No. 20010567-CA

Dear Judge Dever:
This court remanded the above-captioned case to the trial
court on December 20, 2001, for the purpose of settling the
differences in the trial court record which were raised
jointly by the parties. Inasmuch as this motion has been on
remand for more than 120 days, please advise this court as to
the status of the matter within fourteen (14) days from the
date hereof.
Yours truly,

Paulette Stagg 0"
Clerk of the Court
cc: Suzanne West
Greg Wall
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WILLIAM J MENZ
GAIL P MENZ
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Ultra Service Account 129-104388

WILLIAM J MENZ AND GAIL P MENZ

Account Summary

- WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP
Realized Gain/Loss from Fund Sales

Income Summary

Beginning market value as of Oct 1
Withdrawals
Margin interest paid
Change in investment value
Change in debit balance
Ending market value as of Oct 31

$422,997.07
-140,000,00
^"^333.8$N
T67786'.30
105,417.48
404,840.97

Debit balance
Ending Net Value

-105,417.48
$299,423.49

This Period

Taxable
Dividends
St cap gain
Interest
Lt cap gain
Total

This Period

Year lo Dale

Short-term loss
Long-term gain
Long-term loss
Net Long

$0.00
$0.00
0.00
$0.00

$0.00
0.00

$4,233.52
346.74

152.14
0.00
$152.14

1,789.62
531.11

$6,900.99

Quantity
October 31, 1996

Price per Unit
October 31, 1998

Mutual Fund
Total Cost Basis

Tola! Value
October 1, 1998

3,226.0570
931.4750
3,174.6030
1,772.4990

$27.61000
58.35000
11.74000
12.16000

$63,468.75
43,105.81

$83,974.26
50,327.59
39,650.79
20,649.61

Year to

-$122
$3,637
-3,79C
-$15i

As of October 31,1998, the rate on your current debit
balance is 7.00% and you can borrow an ;
$100,274.65 based on your current holdings.
Holdings

(Symbol) as of October 31, 1996

Mutual Funds
M FIDELITY DISCIPLINED EQUITY (FDEQX)
M SELECT TECHNOLOGY (FSPTX)
ALPINE US REAL ESTATE EQUITY C (XCOZX)
M MUTUAL SERIES FINCL SERVICES CLASS Z (TEFAX)

0001

981030 0001 055753375

02 18 008

25,320.79

Total
October 31

$89,07
54,35
37,26
21,55

Page 1
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Investments®
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November 1, 1998 - November30,1998
Customer Service
TouchTone Xpress
800-544-5555
Brokerage Services
800-544-8666
Visit us online at www.fidelity.com
To find out about a new tax-advantaged way to
save for a child's education, visit
wwwJidelity.com/unique or call 1-800-544-191l4.
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MENZ AND, GAIL P MENZ - WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP.
• atfr*

1A c c o u n t

Summary
I n c o m e Summary
pBeginoing value as of Nov 1"
/fs
p;qJ$po;QC£|; Taxable
fAdditi^s; • ,'
. I . / ; : ; - ^
;'
^^Q.QO^Pividends
Withd^wals
5*fo..> - - '
Transaction^ costs, loadgfand f ees ,-, = • ; J H S £ ° > " W cap gain
-•mm^
^Interest
Cha
n9^»Q;iDyfstmentysjje" ;, ..
, >1%gP^2 , .XU.pap gain
T
'".Chang^j^qbitbalan$$Jg- • i
" •/. «.-1«W$*8"- Total
E d,,
" } W « t e » as of Noy^p

Realized Gain/Loss from Fund Sales
This Period

Year lo Oa(«

Thi» Period

Short-term gaixfe
Short-term loss
Net short

Year lo Dale

$1,532.02
-100.88
$1,431.14

$1,532.02
-223.47
$1,308.55

$30,271.51
0.00
$30,271.51

$33,909.08
-3,793.15
$30,115.93

$0.00
0.00
21.12
0.00
$21.12

$4,233.52
346.74
1,810.74
531.11
$6,922.11

Quonlily
November 30,1998

Pi ice per Unit
November 00, 1996

MuluaJ Fund
Tola! Cos! Basis

Tola! Value
November 1, 1996

Total Value
November 30, 1996

1,250.9680
49.9630

$29.02000
67.55000

$24,618.75
2,309.43

$89,071.43
54,351.56

$36,303.09
3,375.00

Long-term gain
Long-term loss
Net Long

As of November 30, 1998, thjygjg on your current
debit balance is 8.75% and y^j^f^n borrow an
^additional $95,105,80 based^ij^gyr current
f o l d i n g s . . ' '> - *
""" """
Ssi v V, x

^Holdings (symbol) «» of N o v t m ^ o ^ m ^

^Mutual Funds
M!FIDELITO'DISC>LW

M^SELECT.TECHNOLOGY^Fi^^^K;>
. r ALPINE US REAL FSTATP%PnTiiT^rfrvt>n7v\

Fidelity

Investments*
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.. ...
Holdings

Y
W#:'«
(Symbol)aa ol Htwintw 30, 1990

M JANUS TWENTY (JAVLX)J3£
M JANUS OVERSEAS (MQgjp* ,
M MUTUAL SERIES BEACON CLASS Z iBEGRX)
Core Account
CASH
For balances below $1,000.00, the current interest rate is 0.69%.

Quantity
Novambar 30,1986

Pile* p»r Unit
Novambat 30,1996

Mutual Fund
Total Coat Baala

Total Valua
Novambar 1,1998

Tol%| Vaiua
November 30, 1998

576.0740
1,243.7500
3,485.8450

46.08000
19.06000
14.12000

25,399.12
22,470.21
40,215.08

78,960.74
77,062.95
46,570.88

26,545 48
23,705 87
49,220.13

186*2200

1.00000

not applicable

186.22

Total Market Value

$201,211.59

D^bjt^ajance

-105,417.48

0.00
$201,211.59

ws*«-g33?5W

Transaction Details *j®tei
Brokerage Activity*48&e&
S^UUrrwnJ
Da*

11/02
11/12

mmi
••^"Wtr

"^~"

CASHffpr
FIOEI^DISCIPLINED
EQUITY

11/12

SELECT TECHNOLOGY
LT RED FEE ~ 7 60

11/12

JANUS TWENTY

11/12

JANUS OVERSEAS

w

*BBttr p w , o < 0
~s#&
Avg Cosl Basis

Dasctiption

Interest earned
You sold
Long-term gam. $16,650.00
You sold
Transaction cost: -$7.50
Short-term gain. $1,532.02
Long-term gain. $13,164.10
You sold
Short-term loss. $100.88
You sold
Long-term gain: $457.41

Quantity

Prlca per Unit

ol Fund Salt

Transaction Amounl

-1,975.0890

$28 10000

$38,850 00

$21.12
55,500.00

-881.5120

62.96000

40,796.38

55,492.50

-1,261.0770

44.01000

55,600.88

55,500.00

-3,049.4510

18.20000

55,042.59

55,500.00

Fidelity
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WILLIAM J MENZ AND GAIL P MENZ - WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP

C o r e A c c o u n t - Cash
Ascription

Amount

Balance

Amount

Description

Checking activity
Beginning
-$105,417,48
-222,000.00
Margin interest
Securities sold
$221,992.50
-409.92
Ending
3ore account income
21.12
Deposits
106,000,00
You have earned $101 64 from your core account this month, and $1,810.74 year to date. This monthly income wilt be posted to your account on the first day of December.
Deposits
Date

<S)

Beian<

$186.2

( 1)
Description

Amount

Dal*

1VJtoADfigp§iTJE£Eiffia^«^iaQ6;000.00
Checking Activity
Check #

Dale

1054

11/16

Description

Amount

Total

Data

Description

Check #

Dale

$106,000.00

(1)
Code

Amount

Check *

222.000.00

Total

Date

Amount

Code

Code

Amoun

-$222,000.00

Margin Activity as of November 30, 1J$$i
Period

Period Balance

10/21-11/22
Total this period
Daily Additions

Interest Rate -

0

and Subtractions

Date

105,409

Balance

•0P3-64
221^992.50

Period Balance

Interest Paid

Period

-$409.92
-$409.92

Total year to date

Interest Rale

Average Daily Balance

Interest Pajc

-$743.8C

Cash <3> $1 per share (the following Is provided to you in accordance with industry regulations)

^Amount

11/10
11/12

Average Daily Balance

7.000%'

.$$603.64
222.596.14

Date
11/16

11/24

Amount

Balance

-222,000.00
-409.92

596.14
186.22

Date

Amount

ms^^m^l

Additio Rf J M E m S M i e a i l l ^ ^ i ^ ^ n v e s t m e n t Report
•

nrmirmmmmmm^^<$fp

Fidelity Tax Managed^tgfifefundIs
inves

now,f variable*, Jhp fund seeks long-term growth and Is sensitive to the potential impact of federal income taxes on shareholder^'

JmsL®f'*'

• ^^S^^^tejiJji^S^gfiJ.the

3% ffantend sales Josdjvas removed from the followmn ftmw* FIHOMU

Balance

HSTS

ACLS

V102

LOAN HISTORY INQUIRY

CFN
NFN
00001 001 000100040000039830
NXT
EFF DAT:
TRAN CODE:
DATE
T/C
DESC
AMOUNT SEL
DATE
04/24/98 95800 STATEMENT
.00 _ 05/04/98
05/04/98 93800 ACCRUAL 34.46 _ 05/26/98
05/26/98 95800 STATEMENT
.00 _ 06/12/98
06/12/98 93800 ACCRUAL 61.23
06/25/98
06/25/98 95800 STATEMENT
.00 _ 07/06/98
07/06/98 93800 ACCRUAL 37.72 _ 07/24/98
07/24/98 95800 STATEMENT
.00 _ 08/13/98
08/13/98 93800 ACCRUAL 71.38
08/26/98
08/26/98 95800 STATEMENT
.00 _ 09/14/98
09/14/98 93800 ACCRUAL 67.54
09/25/98
09/25/98 95800 STATEMENT
.00 _ 10/02/98
10/02/98 93800 ACCRUAL 22.47 _ 10/26/98
m/?6/98 Q38n0 ACr.RTTAT, 92.70
10/26/98
11/05/98 64000 PAYMENT^ 13,533.73(_ 11/05/98

tSKAJM

T/C
64000
93800
64000
93800
64000
93800
64000
93800
64000
93800
64000
35220
95800
93800

DESC
PAYMENT
ACCRUAL PAYMENT
ACCRUAL PAYMENT
ACCRUAL PAYMENT
ACCRUAL PAYMENT
ACCRUAL PAYMENT
RATE CHAN
STATEMENT
ACCRUAL -

PF KEYS 1-HELP 2-MAIN 3-LOGF 4-PREV MENU 7-SCROLL BACK
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
HOLL/T-AYOfTICE
4641 SuUTH 230'. £. ST
SALT LAKE GSTY, UTAH 04117

ui/iu/uu ID;

DIS
AMOUNT SI
120.00
88.01
322.00
52.81
169.00
71.39
125.00
52.54
150.00
44.95
250.00
.00
.00
31.70

